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ABSTRACT
This paper tracks changes in relative centralisation and relative
concentration of poverty for the 25 largest British cities, analysing
change for poor and non-poor groups separately, and examining
parallel changes in spatial segregation. The paper conﬁrms that
poverty is suburbanising, at least in the larger cities, although
poverty remains over-represented in inner locations.
Suburbanisation is occurring through both the reduction in low
income populations in inner locations and the growth non-poor
groups in these places, consistent with a process of displacement.
Relative centralisation of poverty has fallen more stronglythan
relative concentration of poverty, as the outward shift of poorer
groups leaves them still living in denser neighbourhoods on aver-
age. The paper also shows that spatial segregation (unevenness)
declined at the same time although it remains to be seen whether
this indicates a long-term shift to less segregated urban forms or a
transitional outcome before new forms of segregation emerge
around suburban poverty concentrations.
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Introduction
For most cities in early-industrialising countries, suburbanisation initially occurred
through the movement of more aﬄuent groups to the suburbs, taking advantage of
the expansion of public and private transport from the late nineteenth century onwards.
As a result of this selective out-migration, low income groups tended to become over-
represented in older inner urban locations with higher density housing close to the
industrial core. Post-war reconstruction, in European welfare states in particular, led to
some spatial redistribution of poverty to new social housing estates on the edge of the
built-up areas. The general pattern, however, remained one of aﬄuence further out
where the environment was cleaner, and the neighbourhoods more socially “selective”.
Poverty and urban deprivation became primarily “inner city” problems (Robson, 1988).
In recent decades, there have been signs in a number of countries of a gradual shift
away from this situation, described as the “suburbanisation of poverty”; for the US,
Kneebone and Berube (2014), Cooke (2010) and Cooke and Denton (2015); for
Toronto in Canada, Hulchanski et al. (2007); for Australia, Pawson, Hulse, and
Cheshire (2015) and Randolph and Tice (2017); for England, Hunter (2014); and for
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the Netherlands, Hochstenbach and Musterd (2017). The primary driver of change has
been the fundamental shift in urban economies and labour markets under globalisation
(Smith, 2002). More recently, the dismantling of social protection systems under neo-
liberal regimes, including reductions in social housing, is further accelerating the
change through the recommodiﬁcation of housing stocks (Musterd, Marcinczak, Van
Ham, & Tammaru, 2016; Taylor-Gooby, 2013). If these trends continue, the logical
outcome will be, as Ehrenhalt (2012) neatly expressed it, an “urban inversion” – cities
with aﬄuent and exclusive cores, where lower income groups have been driven out.
These shifts raise a number of issues. On the one hand, there are questions about
whether we view the changes as processes of disruption and displacement for low
income groups, during which valued communities are being destroyed, or whether
they arise more through voluntary shifts which reﬂect positive (albeit constrained)
choices (Smith, 2002; Van Gent, 2013). With many former industrial cities marked
by high levels of vacant and derelict land around the urban core, there is some scope for
re-population without the displacement of existing communities but the extensive
literature on gentriﬁcation suggests that that is the exception rather than the rule
(Smith 2002; van Gent 2013). Relatedly, there are questions about the implications of
suburbanisation for the future welfare of low income groups: whether moves to lower
density, less central locations bring more opportunities or costs, for example, in relation
to access to employment, especially for those reliant on public transport (Hulchanski
et al., 2007; Pawson et al., 2015); and whether these moves oﬀer lower income house-
holds access to the better services of the suburbs such as higher quality schools, or a
better environment with lower air pollution (reference removed for review), or strand
them in locations where the provision of basic social services is lacking and civic
organisations are weak (Cooke & Denton, 2015). In some countries, at least, there are
challenges in re-orienting anti-poverty policies and infrastructures designed around
problems of denser inner-urban locations to new settings with very diﬀerent contexts
(Kneebone & Berube, 2014).
More immediately, the challenge for researchers is to capture the scale and nature of
the changes, the processes which underpin them, and the new urban forms which are
emerging. Some important questions include: is poverty suburbanising in all cities, and
to the same extent? Where in the urban areas is poverty moving to? How do we best
capture the changes, given that we lack standard deﬁnitions of core and suburb, and
that cities take an increasing variety of spatial forms? Additionally, is poverty in the
inner cities being diluted through the in-migration of non-poor groups but largely
without displacement, or is the increase in the non-poor population occurring at the
expense of those in poverty? Finally, do the processes lead to a more even distribution
of poverty and a reduction in segregation overall, or to new forms of segregation and
the re-concentration of poverty in some suburban locations?
The aim of the paper is to analyse the extent and nature of the suburbanisation of
poverty in the major cities of England and Scotland. First, we look at overall change for
each city using measures of both centralisation and concentration to cope with pro-
blems of polycentricity and heterogeneous urban forms. Second, we examine changes in
the numbers of poor and non-poor in diﬀerent locations to assess whether any
suburbanisation of poverty is merely a relative one, occurring through dilution of
poverty in inner locations as these areas are re-populated, or an absolute one,
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suggesting displacement of lower income by higher income groups. Third, we examine
the relationship between changes in decentralisation, deconcentration, and spatial
segregation or unevenness – the extent to which poor and non-poor tend to live in
the same neighbourhoods regardless of where in the city these are located.
Background
Drivers of poverty suburbanisation
Cities appear to be undergoing quite fundamental transformations in spatial organisa-
tion under the impact of a related set of economic, political and social processes: rising
income and wealth inequalities, reﬂecting in part the impacts of globalisation and
economic restructuring; parallel political shifts in welfare and housing policies under
neo-liberal political regimes; and social changes of deferred family formation as well as
cultural preferences for urban living (Atkinson, 2014; Musterd et al., 2016; Peck, 2014).
Rising inequality feeds through into the urban system, both in an increased desire for
spatial distance to reﬂect socio-economic distance (Musterd et al., 2016), but also
because of the increasing ability of higher income groups to outbid lower income
ones in the housing market for desired neighbourhoods (Hulchanski et al., 2007;
Randolph & Tice, 2017). Related to this is the continued restructuring of urban
economies and labour markets under the dual inﬂuences of technological change and
globalisation. Urban labour markets have seen a loss of employment opportunities for
skilled manual workers, particularly in more central urban locations, alongside the
growth in professional and other white collar occupations. Whether these changes are
described as polarisation, or professionalisation (Hamnett, 1998; Sassen, 1991), there is
a relative decline in the market position of lower income groups.
While structural economic shifts help explain the rising opportunity for higher
income groups to move into central urban areas, other factors are needed to explain
why they choose to take this up. Cultural explanations provide part of the answer,
although they do not stand apart from economic factors. Urban living has been
promoted by those interested in the recommodiﬁcation and redevelopment of inner
urban locations (Smith, 2002; Urban Task Force, 1999). The latter includes both private
interests but also the increasingly “entrepreneurial” urban governments seeking to
maintain or re-build the economic base of their cities (Harvey 1989; Peck, 2014).
Other factors include the demographic shift of deferred fertility and hence the rising
number of young adults in childless households (Castles, 2003), for whom inner urban
locations oﬀer many advantages.
Politics and policy are implicated at a range of levels. Rising inequality reﬂects in part
changes in labour market regulation and social protection measures (Atkinson, 2014).
More directly, urban policy has played a signiﬁcant role in facilitating – and occasion-
ally limiting – processes of gentriﬁcation (Bailey & Robertson, 1997; Smith, 2002). In
the 1980s and 1990s, eﬀorts to stem urban population loss and drive re-investment in
declining urban areas were promoted by governments as interventions that would
beneﬁt existing (and especially poorer) residents by increasing economic opportunities
and promoting more mixed communities (Schoon, 2001; Urban Task Force, 1999).
Others criticised these eﬀorts as state-led gentriﬁcation or neo-liberal urbanism,
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designed to displace working class communities for the pursuit of capital and middle
class interests (Smith, 2002; Hochstenbach and Musterd 2017). In part, judgements
about the impact of these programmes hinge on the eventual outcome: whether it is the
development of stable mixed communities, still providing access to housing for low-
income groups; or transitory mixing, before the eventual displacement of low-income
groups, leading eventually to exclusive upper- or middle-class occupation of the urban
cores. Displacement here is understood in the broad sense of both direct replacement of
poor housholds by non-poor, but also indirect eﬀects where poor households lose the
ability to access a neighbourhood due to rising housing costs (Marcuse, 1985).
Wider welfare and housing policies play a role in the pace and form of change
(Musterd and Ostendorf 1998). Many countries have seen the progressive erosion in
welfare beneﬁt levels, with an acceleration since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/8,
which has been used to legitimise the rolling back of the state (Taylor-Gooby, 2013).
Housing policy decisions are especially important, with investment in de-commodiﬁed
social housing limitting the scope for market-led restructuring (Bailey & Robertson,
1997), whereas eﬀorts to recommodify housing have the opposite eﬀect (Forrest &
Hirayama, 2015). In the UK, key policy changes from the 1980s and 1990s have been
towards re-commodiﬁcation, notably through the sale of social housing to tenants
under the Right-to-Buy, and the encouragement of investment in private renting
through the deregulation of tenancies and of lending institutions (Kemp, 2010;
Malpass, 2005).
Since 2007/8, the UK has seen successive moves to reduce entitlements to welfare
and housing subsidies for tenants, particularly in the newly-expanded private rented
sector. There are tighter limits on the rent levels which can be covered by Housing
Beneﬁts, caps on the total amount of beneﬁts which a household can receive in one year
including housing subsidies, and reduced entitlements for younger adults to housing
subsidies (Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2014). These changes are
explicitly intended to make the recipient households more “cost-conscious” and
hence to drive changes in consumption patterns, as well as increasing incentives to
ﬁnd paid work or extend working hours. Early evaluations of the impact of these
changes have shown particular pressures in the highest cost locations such as central
London driving outward moves of poorer households (Department for Work and
Pensions (DWP), 2014).
At the other end of the suburbanisation process, there is an important literature which
has examined the growing diﬀerentiation within suburban locations and the emergence
of decline within a particular sub-group of these places. Terms may vary but the broad
details are clear: these are older inner suburbs, often from the post-war years where
housing is becoming obsolescent compared with newer suburban developments, but
reinvestment is more sporadic and uncoordinated than in the urban core. Many of
these locations suﬀer a combination of social problems (high unemployment and
crime, for example) and poor infrastructure and public services (Randolph and
Freestone 2012; Hanlon 2010) which are often associated with inner urban locations.
While the broad drivers of the suburbanisation of poverty are clear, we would of
course expect to see some degree of variation between places, as processes are histori-
cally and institutionally contingent as the evolutionary economics literature highlights
(Boschma & Frenken, 2006). Cooke and Denton (2015) show variations in patterns of
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poverty decentralisation between the major US metropolitan areas. In a closely-related
study of spatial segregation in European cities, Musterd et al. (2016) show variation in
both pace and direction of change in recent years, and relates this to a number of
structural characteristics including the strength of ties to the global economy and the
nature of the local welfare regime.
In the UK context, we would expect various factors to inﬂuence the pace of change. First
there is city size, positively related both to agglomeration beneﬁts and disbeneﬁts, but also
to the physical separation and hence commuting costs that go with suburban residence.We
would expect pressures to be greater in the larger conurbations, with London a clear outlier
in the UK context. Second, there is the state of the local economywhich translates into both
wage levels and housing costs, and hence aﬀordability for lower income households.
Aﬀordability indices for England show wide variations between cities with particular
problems again in London which contains seven of the ten local authorities with the least
aﬀordable housing in 2016 (Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS), 2017). It is in the higher
cost locations that the cuts and caps in Housing Beneﬁts will also have most bite
(Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2014).
The relationship between suburbanisation and spatial segregation or unevenness may
not be simple. While, in general, we might expect that cities will ultimately become
more segregated as poverty suburbanises – Ehrenhalt’s “urban inversion” thesis – it is
possible that the processes bring at least a temporary reduction in segregation as inner
urban neighbourhoods become more mixed during a transitional stage. Bailey, Van
Gent, and Musterd (2017) show exactly this kind of change at work in Amsterdam
during the early 2000s, for example. It is also possible in theory for decentralisation or
suburbanisation to be associated with a dispersal of poverty and hence a longer-term
reduction in segregation rather than new concentrations emerging in suburban loca-
tions although, in practice, this seems highly unlikely given that spatial inequalities have
been almost the deﬁning feature of modern cities.
Conceptual and measurement challenges
The term “suburbanisation” implies movement to areas with a particular built form and
density, but it also carries important connotations of class and lifestyle, most notably of
safety and conformity, in contrast to the “dangerous” or “degenerate” inner cities
(Kneebone & Berube, 2014). Suburbanisation therefore carries suggestions not just of
loss or displacement, but also new opportunity. In most locations, however, we lack
clear deﬁnitions of the “suburb”. In the UK, Hunter (2014) uses a combination of
housing type (low proportions of ﬂats or terraced housing, to try to exclude inner urban
locations) and density (above a minimum threshold, to exclude rural areas) as the basis
of his analysis. Such an approach is open to a number of challenges over the selection of
cut-oﬀ points. Others have focussed on density alone (Cooke & Denton, 2015, for
example), oﬀering more transparency but reducing suburbanisation to deconcentration.
An alternative is to focus centrality or distance from the city centre. This places a
greater emphasis on physical location and, in particular, distance from and accessibility
to the urban core. It foregrounds to a greater extent concerns about loss of access to the
centre and the opportunities which that might oﬀer, most notably for employment.
Identiﬁcation of the central location from which to measure distance remains a minor
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issue although empirical testing in relation to measures of decentralisation suggests it
has minimal impact (Kavanagh, Lee, & Pryce, 2016). In the traditional monocentric
city, there is a strong relationship between centrality and density, so the choice between
deconcentration and decentralisation measures may be relatively unimportant but the
growing polycentricity of many urban areas means that movement away from the main
centre does not always represent movement to more suburban settings. Capturing
suburbanisation through a combination of decentralisation and deconcentration mea-
sures is therefore important, as is an understanding of the relationship between
centrality and density for each city.
A related measurement issue is how we deﬁne our cities. If the boundary is drawn
too tightly, it will exclude many areas which function as suburbs of the central city. In
the UK context at least, administrative boundaries are highly problematic in this regard
due to the very variable basis on which these have emerged, with signiﬁcant under-
bounding in many cases; the contrast between the city authorities for Leeds and
Manchester is particularly stark. Physical built-up areas are little better, particularly in
contexts like the UK, where planning policies have sought to contain outward sprawl
through Green Belts, pushing urban overspill into physically-separated but functionally-
connected settlements. City-regions or travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) oﬀer a better
basis for analysis since they are constructed from commuting ﬂow data that reﬂect
functional urban/regional relationships. However, the inclusion of surrounding settle-
ments again means that the relationships between centrality and density may be more
complex. Indeed, some TTWAs in the UK are composed of two or more urban centres
of similar size, forming polycentric urban regions. As before, the solution is to pay
greater attention to deconcentration in more polycentric contexts.
A last issue concerns how it is that any decentralisation or deconcentration of
poverty comes about. If there is increasing housing supply in inner or denser areas
which is taken up by non-poor groups, decentralisation and deconcentration of poverty
can occur without any reduction in the absolute numbers in poverty in these locations.
In such cases, suburbanisation is a relative process as poverty is “diluted” in inner or
denser neighbourhoods without displacement. High levels of vacant and derelict land in
many former industrial centres make this a real possibility. Alternatively, change can
occur through absolute suburbanisation if inner or denser areas see reductions in the
number of people in poverty able to live there. To capture these processes, we need to
move beyond global measures of the distribution of one group relative to another, and
look at the distribution of each group separately.
Data and methods
Poverty by neighbourghood
In the UK, each of the four national governments publishes area deprivation measures
for small geographic areas through their oﬃcial Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD).
The IMDs have been constructed on a consistent basis since 2004 by compiling data
from a wide range of administrative sources (for details, see Noble, Wright, Smith, &
Dibben, 2006). They are widely used by government in policy analyses and resource
allocation decisions, as well as by many researchers. The English IMDs (EIMDs) were
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updated in 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2015, while the Scottish IMDs (SIMD) were updated
in 2004, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2016.
The spatial units for the EIMD are called Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs),
designed to have populations between 1000 and 2000. Relatively minor adjustments
were made to LSOA boundaries for the 2015 index to reﬂect population changes, with a
small minority of LSOAs split or merged (and just 0.5 per cent seeing more complex
changes). We re-apportion data for the earlier years to the 2015 boundaries based on
the number of postcodes found in each area.1
The analogous units for the SIMD are termed Datazones (DZ) with considerably
smaller populations, between 500 and 1000. Boundaries were comprehensively updated
in 2016 to reﬂect population changes. Data for earlier years can be re-aggregated to the
new boundaries on the same basis as in England although the more complex boundary
changes mean this leads to a lower quality ﬁt. For measures of centralisation or
concentration, we would expect this to have minimal impact. The centrality or density
of neighbouring areas will usually be very similar, certainly with the former.
Reallocations between neighbouring areas through boundary changes will therefore
have limited impacts on overall measures of centralisation or concentration so results
for these measures are all presented using current boundaries. (When inspecting trends
across all the years with these data, we see no signs of discontinuity between years using
reaggregated data and the subsequent year.) For measures of spatial segregation,
reaggregation can eﬀectively move populations between neighbourhoods with quite
contrasting concentrations of poverty or disadvantage; Glasgow in particular has been
shown to have a much more fragmented social geography than comparably deprived
English cities making the risks here particularly great (Livingston et al., 2011). As a
result, reaggregation for the Scottish Datazones may lead to signiﬁcant error, rendering
comparisons between measures based on old and new boundaries problematic.
(Inspecting trends across the years, we see a sharp discontinuity when moving from
reaggregated data to the latest year.) When looking at spatial segregation for the two
Scottish cities, we therefore base our analysis on the original (2001) Datazone bound-
aries, making 2012 the latest available time point.
As part of the overall measure of area deprivation, both IMDs construct a measure of
Income Deprivation and it is this which forms the basis for our analysis. This is a low-
income poverty measure, capturing the proportion of people living in households in
receipt of a national government welfare beneﬁt or tax credit by virtue of their low-
income. Importantly for our work, this measure covers not just the unemployed or
those unable to work through long-term sickness or disability, as well as the low-
income retired, but also people in employment who are still on low income. The UK
government’s analysis shows that more than half of people in low-income poverty in
the UK live in households where there is at least one person in paid work (Department
for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2017); that study uses a household survey measure,
deﬁning low income poverty as below 60 per cent of the median (equivalised) house-
hold income. There are some minor diﬀerences between EIMD and SIMD Income
Deprivation measures although they are quite comparable (for details, see Noble et al.,
2006; Payne & Abel, 2012). Both measures very largely exclude full-time students as
they are not eligible for the majority of the beneﬁts on which the indices are based.
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The detailed construction of both measures has changed over time as the welfare
beneﬁts and tax credit systems have evolved. These measures should not therefore be
used to draw conclusions about how the absolute level of poverty in a neighbourhood
or city has changed over time. In our analyses, we avoid this problem by focussing on
the relative distribution of poverty across the cities at each time point. In eﬀect, the
changes in deﬁnition mean that we use a slightly diﬀerent threshold for our poverty
measure at each time point but there is little reason to expect this small variation will be
strongly related to the geography of poverty within each city.2
Categorisation of urban regions
In this paper, cities or urban regions are deﬁned on the basis of oﬃcial TTWAs, as
updated in 2016 to reﬂect commuting patterns in the 2011 Census (Oﬃce for
National Statistics (ONS), 2015). In general, residential moves within TTWAs
should represent moves without a change in labour market area. Our selection
of centres for each TTWA involved visual inspection of the central point suggested
by typing in the name of a TTWA’s central city or town into an on-line mapping
tool. The LSOA/DZ which contained this central point and contiguous LSOAs/
DZs, were considered possible candidates for the central zone of the TTWA. The
judgement about which to deﬁne as the centre was inﬂuenced by factors such as
the presence of city halls, main shopping streets or central railway stations within
the zone. The central point from which centrality was calculated was the geo-
graphic centroid of this central LSOA/DZ. Earlier analyses have shown that using
diﬀerent plausible deﬁnitions of the central areal unit and point, or using alter-
native cut-oﬀs for city limits had no substantive inﬂuence on measures of relative
centralisation (Kavanagh et al., 2016). The code and data used to produce all
analyses are publically available (see endnote 2) and so readers are free to explore
the eﬀect of using diﬀerent choices of centre.
We have used the largest 25 TTWAs by population as our set of cities, avoiding
any other selection criteria.3 Table 1 shows their populations in 2009/10 and
poverty rates (Income Deprivation) for the ﬁrst and last year. The latter are not
to indicate change in poverty levels over time given the limitations discussed
above but to show that the Income Deprivation measures oﬀer a relatively con-
sistent threshold over time; the changes over time within each city are much
smaller than the diﬀerences between cities. Income Deprivation ranges from less
than 10 per cent in some of the smaller cities of the south of England to 20 per
cent or more for the larger cities.
We have chosen not to limit our selection of urban areas to only those which
conform to a monocentric form of development in order to examine change across
the spectrum of urban contexts which exist in Britain today. Our set is intention-
ally mixed, and we have therefore grouped them based on a combination of size
(population) and form. For the latter, we look at the correlation between density
of neighbourhoods and distance from the city centre. A high correlation implies a
more monocentric form as density declines more evenly with distance. This yields
three groups. First we have a group comprising the 11 largest cities. All are
relatively monocentric in form with a recognisable core city. In some cases, the
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correlations between centrality and density are relatively low (0.3 to 0.4), reﬂecting
a combination of population thinning in inner areas and the capture of signiﬁcant
secondary settlements within the TTWA boundary; Manchester, Glasgow and
Newcastle are the main examples here. Second we have smaller cities which are
relatively monocentric in form; correlations between centrality and density are
above 0.3. Third we have smaller TTWAs with more complex, polycentric urban
forms where the main settlement is not as obviously dominant, as sometimes
indicated in the TTWA names; correlations of centrality and density are below
0.3. This group comprises Warrington & Wigan, Wolverhampton & Walsall, and
Guildford & Aldershot, as well as Luton, Southend and Cambridge.
Table 1. City types and characteristics.
% Income
Deprived
Housing
aﬀordability
City Population (‘000s) 2004 2015/16
Correlation of centrality
& density 2004 2016
Larger
London 7210 17% 17% 0.65 8.5 13.5
Manchester 2510 18% 18% 0.30 3.7 6.1
Birmingham 1600 20% 20% 0.41 6.0 6.2
Glasgow 1360 20% 16% 0.33 n/a n/a
Newcastle 1020 19% 18% 0.31 5.3 5.6
Liverpool 950 25% 23% 0.39 3.7 4.2
Leicester 890 12% 14% 0.57 6.4 6.8
Sheﬃeld 820 17% 17% 0.40 5.2 5.5
Leeds 810 14% 16% 0.50 5.4 5.8
Bristol 800 12% 13% 0.52 7.1 9.0
Nottingham 780 15% 16% 0.44 5.1 5.1
Smaller monocentric
Edinburgh 730 12% 10% 0.52 n/a n/a
Southampton 650 9% 10% 0.58 6.9 8.0
Crawley 590 6% 8% 0.37 7.5 10.3
Medway 570 11% 14% 0.45 6.5 8.6
Coventry 570 14% 15% 0.49 5.2 6.5
Reading 540 6% 8% 0.32 7.5 10.6
Portsmouth 530 11% 13% 0.58 7.2 7.8
Oxford 520 7% 8% 0.37 9.5 12.5
Smaller polycentric
Warrington & Wigan 780 16% 16% 0.08 5.6 6.1
Wolverhampton & Walsall 720 17% 20% 0.29 5.1 5.8
Luton 680 10% 12% 0.27 6.9 9.1
Cambridge 660 7% 9% −0.04 8.4 13.8
Guildford & Aldershot 620 6% 7% 0.16 9.3 12.1
Southend 560 13% 15% 0.23 6.2 7.7
Averages
All 25 1099 13% 14% 0.38 6.4 8.1
Larger 1705 17% 17% 0.44 5.6 6.8
Smaller monocentric 588 10% 11% 0.46 7.2 9.2
Smaller polycentric 670 11% 13% 0.16 6.9 9.1
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD except housing aﬀordability which comes from Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS)
(2017) – see text for deﬁnition. Income Deprivation is not directly comparable between the two countries nor over
time – see text. Population and correlation data for 2009/10, with latter based on deciles for neighbourhoods within
each city-region.
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Measurement of centralisation, concentration and segregation
We calculate separate measures of centralisation and concentration to capture the
relative spatial distribution of poor and non-poor groups in each city at each time
point. The Relative Centralisation Index (RCI) measures the extent to which one group
tends to live closer to (or further away from) the city centre, relative to another group
(Massey & Denton, 1988). This ranges from ‘1ʹ where the reference group (here, the
poor or Income Deprived) occupies all the sites around the centre to ‘-1ʹ where they
occupy all the sites at the city’s edge. It is calculated as:
RCI ¼
XN
k¼2
Xk1Yk  XkYk1ð Þ
Ordering the N neighbourhoods of the city by centrality or distance from the centre,
Xk is the cumulative proportion of group X in neighbourhoods 1 to k. Xk is for the
reference category (in this paper, the poor or Income Deprived) and Yk is the remain-
der (here, the non-poor).
The Relative Density Index (RDI) measures concentration or the extent to which one
group tends to live in more or less densely occupied locations, relative to another. It is
calculated on exactly the same basis as RCI only ordering neighbourhoods by density
(descending) rather than centrality, and it shares the same −1 to +1 scale. Density is
calculated simply as the ratio of the population to the gross area of the neighbourhood
unit with no attempt to allow for land given over to infrastructure, large open spaces or
open water.
We also calculate a simple measure of spatial segregation or unevenness, using the
familiar Index of Dissimilarity (D). This captures the extent to which each neighbour-
hood contains a similar share of the city’s poor and non-poor groups (Duncan &
Duncan, 1955). This ranges from ‘0ʹ (completely even distribution) to ‘1ʹ (complete
segregation):
D ¼ 0:5
XN
k¼1
xk=X  yk=Yð Þj j
Summing across the N neighbourhoods of the city, xk is the number of people in
neighbourhood k who are poor and X the total number poor in the city, with yk and Y
the corresponding ﬁgures for non-poor.
Table 1 also reports a housing aﬀordability measure for the core authority in each
TTWA to give an indication of pressures in the housing system, particularly in central
city locations; for London, we use the combined Greater London authorities. Housing
aﬀordability is the ratio of lower quartile house price to lower quartile gross annual
(residence-based) earnings (Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS), 2017); the measure is
not available for the two Scottish cities. Housing aﬀordability worsens over time in
almost every case, suggesting that the impacts of the recession following the Global
Financial Crisis on house prices were less than their impacts on wages at the lower end
of the market. Of the large cities, London clearly faces exceptional pressures, but
aﬀordability problems are also evident in a number of the smaller southern cities.
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Results
(i) Distribution of poverty
Table 2 provides all three measures of the spatial distribution of poor and non-poor
groups (RCI, RDI and D) for each city in 2004 and 2015/16, as well as change over time.
As Table 2 shows, poverty is relatively centralised in almost all of our cities as expected
although there are exceptions. In four cases, RCI is zero or negative in one or both
years. Three of these cities are in the group of smaller polycentric TTWAs, with
Cambridge showing the strongest decentralisation. Two factors are at work in that
case: polycentricity within the TTWA due to the inclusion of a London overspill New
Town (Harlow) far from the central city; and the presence of a well-preserved and high-
demand historic core with limited housing opportunities for lower income groups.
Housing aﬀordability is particularly poor in the Cambridge local authority which covers
the main city (Table 1). The other two in this group have strongly polycentric forms, as
indicated by the names, suggesting that centrality is a less useful measure in these cases.
The fourth exception is Edinburgh, a smaller monocentric city which is similar to
Cambridge in having a well-preserved historic core where post-war redevelopment for
Table 2. Centralisation, concentration and dissimilarity indices for the 25 TTWAs – 2004–2015/16.
RCI RDI D
TTWA 2004 2015/16 Change 2004 2015/16 Change 2004 2015/16 Change
Larger
London 0.17 0.08 −0.09 0.22 0.15 −0.07 0.34 0.28 −0.06
Manchester 0.19 0.11 −0.08 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.40 0.35 −0.05
Birmingham 0.31 0.22 −0.09 0.25 0.22 −0.03 0.40 0.35 −0.05
Glasgow 0.19 0.13 −0.07 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.38 0.331 −0.05
Newcastle 0.13 0.06 −0.07 0.09 0.09 −0.01 0.36 0.32 −0.03
Liverpool 0.23 0.15 −0.08 0.14 0.12 −0.02 0.39 0.35 −0.04
Leicester 0.31 0.24 −0.07 0.29 0.25 −0.03 0.40 0.34 −0.06
Sheﬃeld 0.11 0.05 −0.07 0.10 0.08 −0.02 0.39 0.37 −0.01
Leeds 0.34 0.25 −0.08 0.20 0.18 −0.02 0.41 0.39 −0.02
Bristol 0.21 0.16 −0.06 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.38 0.35 −0.02
Nottingham 0.19 0.10 −0.09 0.21 0.17 −0.04 0.38 0.34 −0.05
Smaller monocentric
Edinburgh 0.02 −0.05 −0.08 0.15 0.11 −0.04 0.38 0.311 −0.07
Southampton 0.26 0.21 −0.05 0.24 0.21 −0.03 0.36 0.33 −0.03
Crawley 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.26 −0.03
Medway 0.07 0.05 −0.02 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.32 0.30 −0.03
Coventry 0.17 0.13 −0.03 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.37 0.32 −0.05
Reading 0.18 0.17 −0.01 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.36 0.32 −0.04
Portsmouth 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.33 0.31 −0.02
Oxford 0.14 0.08 −0.06 0.20 0.16 −0.04 0.33 0.29 −0.03
Smaller polycentric
Warrington and Wigan 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.39 0.36 −0.03
Wolverhampton and Walsall 0.19 0.16 −0.03 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.35 0.32 −0.03
Luton 0.21 0.19 −0.02 0.25 0.20 −0.05 0.36 0.31 −0.05
Cambridge −0.08 −0.11 −0.03 0.16 0.12 −0.04 0.31 0.28 −0.03
Guildford and Aldershot 0.02 0.00 −0.01 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.33 0.31 −0.03
Southend 0.05 0.03 −0.02 0.18 0.16 −0.01 0.34 0.32 −0.03
Averages
All 0.15 0.11 −0.05 0.17 0.16 −0.02 0.36 0.32 −0.04
London + next ten 0.22 0.14 −0.08 0.17 0.15 −0.02 0.38 0.34 −0.04
Smaller monocentric 0.13 0.10 −0.03 0.17 0.16 −0.01 0.34 0.31 −0.04
Smaller polycentric 0.06 0.05 −0.02 0.18 0.17 −0.01 0.35 0.31 −0.03
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD. (1) Figure for D in 2015/16 for Edinburgh and Glasgow based on 2012 data due to
boundary change problems.
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social housing was heavily restricted and where demand for housing is high, and has
been for some time. In a further three cities, RCI falls below 0.05, indicating low relative
centralisation of poverty. At the other end of the spectrum, the highest levels of RCI are
found predominantly in the large monocentric cities.
Table 2 also shows that poverty is relatively concentrated. Indeed, concentration is a
more consistent feature across the set of cities; RDI is above 0.08 in every city and at
every time point, indicating that Income Deprived groups tend to live in higher density
neighbourhoods. For the largest cities in 2004, poverty was more strongly related to
centrality than to density; RCI was greater than RDI in all but three of these eleven
cases – London, Manchester and Nottingham were the exceptions. In the smaller cities,
the opposite was true with only three cases in this group where RCI was greater than
RDI in that initial year (Southampton, Coventry and Wolverhampton & Walsall).
A ﬁner-grained picture of the distribution of poverty at the start of our study period
(2004) is shown in Figure 1. This plots the share of the poor within a city living in each
decile of neighbourhoods, ordered by centrality (distance from the centre) and by
density (descending). Equal population deciles are used so that comparisons between
cities are more easily made since cities vary in spatial extent and in the range of
densities present. In these plots, a value of ‘0.1ʹ (i.e. 10 per cent) therefore indicates
that a decile has the same share of those in poverty as it does of the total population.
For the larger cities, the share of poverty declines with both distance and density as
expected, although the relationship of poverty with density is generally the more
consistent than that with centrality. In every case, poverty is over-represented in the
most central and most dense deciles, but under-represented in (almost) all of the less
central or less dense half of the cities. There are local variations apparent, with more
pronounced centralisation in some cases (notably Birmingham, Leicester and Leeds). In
London, the most central decile already showed a share of poverty in 2004 which was
only marginally above the average for the TTWA although poverty levels were higher in
the next four deciles.
In most of the smaller monocentric cities, the patterns were similar but in three cases
– Edinburgh, Southampton and Oxford – the peak concentration of poverty by distance
was not in the ﬁrst two deciles. In the smaller polycentric cities, the distributions by
centrality showed two or more peaks rather than a steady decline in poverty share with
distance, whereas those by density showed more continuous downward trends. The
former indicate concentrations in secondary centres and again this underlines the
problem of using centralisation measures in these contexts.
(ii) decentralisation and deconcentration
Changes in RCI and RDI over time give a global picture of suburbanisation in the 25
cities (Table 2 and Figure 2). Poverty became less centralised and less concentrated in
almost every case. Change on each measure is broadly correlated (R = 0.50) but the pace
of decentralisation is clearly greater than of deconcentration. Comparing 2004 with
2015/16, the average reductions were 0.05 for RCI compared with 0.02 for RDI
respectively. The cities with the greatest relative centralisation and concentration of
poverty in 2004 saw the largest reductions on each measure. By 2015/16, the degree of
concentration was greater than of centralisation in 20 of the 25 cities, including six of
the largest eleven.
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The pace of change was greatest in the larger cities, particularly London which saw
the biggest reductions in relative concentration and the second biggest reduction in
relative centralisation. The changes ﬁt with our expectations about the role of city size
discussed above. It is also in London that the constraints on welfare beneﬁts, particu-
larly housing beneﬁt, will have most impact due to high house and rental prices
(Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2014; Lupton, 2011). At the same time,
it is clear that while low income groups are being pushed out of the more central areas,
Figure 1. Share of poor within the city by centrality and density – 2004.
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD. Equal population deciles based on data for 2004. Decile 1 is most dense or closest to
city centre. TTWAs ordered by size within type: red – larger; blue – smaller monocentric; green – smaller polycentric.
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they are not moving to areas with much lower densities as relative concentration is not
falling at the same rate. Rather they are moving to less central but still relatively dense
neighbourhoods. For the group of larger cities, decentralisation is greater than decon-
centration in every case.
With the smaller monocentric cities, there is a more mixed picture. Three cases
(Edinburgh, Southampton and Oxford) show changes similar to those in the larger cities,
with falls on both measures, particularly centralisation. Edinburgh is particularly striking
since it had one of the lowest levels of centralisation to start with. The other two both
have relatively poor aﬀordability. Other smaller cities show only limited change on either
measure, with one (Crawley) showing a modest increase in the centralisation of poverty
while another (Medway) shows a modest increase in concentration.
The polycentric cities showed the least centralisation to start with and they show
little change on this measure, though the concept of “centralisation” is inherently
problematic in these cases. Levels of concentration were similar to the other cities at
the outset and there is little change in most cases although two cases (Luton and
Cambridge) see signiﬁcant reductions. In Luton, a city with a stronger industrial
base, the concentration of poverty was one of the highest of any of the set of 25 cities
at the outset and it remained well above average in 2015/16.
(iii) Relative versus absolute changes
We turn now to the question of whether suburbanisation occurs through relative or
absolute changes in the distribution of those in poverty. We do not measure changes in
the absolute number of people who are poor or not-poor over time due to the
alterations to the Income Deprivation measure discussed above. Instead, we look at
how the share of the poor and non-poor within each city shift over time for each decile
of neighbourhoods. Figure 3 shows changes for the share poor and non-poor by deciles
Figure 2. Change in RCI versus change in RDI – 2004 to 2015/16.
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD.
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of distance from centre (as deﬁned in 2004) while Figure 4 shows the equivalent by
density. Deciles are deﬁned in 2004 so the shifts show the eﬀects of both new housing
supply and changes in the occupation of the existing stock. For each group (poor or
non-poor), the changes across the deciles in a city sum to zero since a gain by one decile
comes at the expense of others.
Figure 3. Change in share of poor and non-poor by distance from city centre – 2004–2015/16.
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD. Equal population deciles based on data for 2004. Decile 1 is closest to city centre.
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London is again an exceptional case in the UK context. It shows the most wholesale
change and a pattern which is rather diﬀerent to the other cities, with the most central
ﬁve deciles all showing a reduction in their share of the poor and a gain in their share of
the non-poor. There is a similar picture in relation to density with only the most dense
decile not showing a rise in the non-poor group. As noted above, this city showed the
second greatest drop in RCI and the greatest drop in RDI. Here we can clearly see
Figure 4. Change in share of poor and non-poor by density – 2004–2015/16.
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD. Equal population deciles based on data for 2004. Decile 1 is most dense.
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absolute suburbanisation underway, and it is aﬀecting the most central half of the city.
Between them, the inner ﬁve deciles saw their share of the TTWA’s poor decline by 5.3
per cent. With around 1.22 million poor in London (taking the population and poverty
rates from Table 1), this equates to a reduction of approximately 65,000 poor people in
an 11 year period within this half of the city.
In the other larger cities, the changes are less extensive, but nevertheless there is clear
evidence of absolute suburbanisation. In terms of centrality, the changes mainly occur in
the most central one or two deciles. These were the locations with the greatest over-
representation of the poor population in 2004 (see Figure 1 above). It is in these places
that the share of the city’s poor declines most markedly while the share of the non-poor
rises simultaneously. Liverpool is an exception here, as the rise in non-poor groups in the
central decile is accompanied by only minimal decline in the share of poor groups living
there, suggesting only relative suburbanisation in this case. Liverpool local authority has the
most aﬀordable housing of any of the cities in our study (Table 1) so the impacts of welfare
reform are likely to be least signiﬁcant here. In other cases, the absolute scale of the impacts
is again substantial: for Manchester, we can estimate 13,000 fewer poor living in the inner
two deciles, 9000 fewer in Birmingham and 6000 fewer in Glasgow. Across the eleven larger
cities, the number of poor in the inner two deciles has declined by about 80,000.
In relation to density (Figure 4), it is less clear that the process underway involves
absolute displacement. Rather the picture is of a general drift of both groups towards
less densely occupied deciles. In the densest decile, there is a sharper fall in the share of
poor in most cases, but much less sign of an increasing share of non-poor in the same
locations. A couple of cities see some replacement of poor by non-poor groups in the
most dense areas (Leicester or Nottingham, for example) but other cities – such as
Glasgow – see a reduction in the proportion of poor people without simultaneous in-
movement of non-poor.
With the smaller monocentric cities, the picture is even more varied. The cities where
poverty became more decentralised and deconcentrated – Edinburgh, Southampton and
Oxford – show a process of decentralisation which is similar to the larger cities. The change
in Edinburgh appears especially widespread, with the inner ﬁve deciles all showing a
declining share of the poor, equivalent to a reduction of around 4000. Here, there is
evidence of absolute suburbanisation as the most central deciles lose their share of the
poor population while gaining share of the non-poor, although the changes are not as
sharply deﬁned as with the large cities. In terms of concentration, both poor and non-poor
are moving towards less dense neighbourhoods in these cities so it is the faster pace of out-
movement by the poor which produces relative deconcentration. In the other cities in this
group, the patterns of change are much more similar for poor and non-poor which is why
relative centralisation and concentration were little changed in these cases.
For the polycentric group, only Luton and Cambridge showed both decentralisation
and deconcentration. Both show evidence of a shift from poor to non-poor in the most
central decile and, in Luton’s case, also the densest decile, but patterns are more varied
in other parts of these cities. For the four remaining polycentric regions, however, the
main change is the deconcentration of the population, poor and non-poor, rather than
the direct substitution of one for another so again it is diﬃcult to see this as a process of
absolute suburbanisation.
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(iv) Suburbanisation and spatial segregation
Up to now, the paper has focussed on suburbanisation but this has served to mask an
important shift common to almost all of our cities: the reduction in levels of spatial
segregation or unevenness (last three columns of Table 2). Spatial segregation is a ubiqui-
tous feature of modern and post-modern cities, and one which is frequently seen as
problematic by governments (Livingston, Kearns, & Bailey, 2013). Musterd et al. (2016)
argue that segregation has been rising in European cities, at least in their group of capital
cities. Direct comparisons of levels of segregation are problematic since they depend so
much on the set of neighbourhood units used to divide up each city but it is clear that, for
our group of British cities at least, segregation has been declining in this period. D fell from
an average of .36 to .32 with mean falls similar for the three groups of cities. If we examine
the measure across all the intervening years (not shown), we see a steady and continuous
decline in almost every case, indicating this change is not merely noise.
In general, greater falls were seen in cities which had higher starting levels of
segregation. The larger cities had slightly more segregation in 2004 and almost all
showed substantial reductions by 2015/16 (2012 for the two Scottish cities). Leeds, and
to a lesser extent Sheﬃeld, appear slightly diﬀerent with the former having the highest
level of segregation in 2004 and one of the lower reductions. London had a lower
starting point but the second largest reduction in segregation (from .34 to .28, down
.06), again reﬂecting the scale of change underway there. For the smaller monocentric
cities, Edinburgh had the highest initial segregation and the greatest fall. Reductions in
segregation correlate with changes in centralisation and concentration (0.40 and 0.60
respectively).
This analysis puts the processes of suburbanisation is a rather diﬀerent light. On the
basis of these ﬁgures, suburbanisation could be portrayed as a shift to a more balanced
urban form, moving from an over-concentration of poorer households in inner areas to
a more even distribution across the cities, oﬀering a route to the kinds of social mix
advocated in many urban policy statements. Of course, the long-term impacts of
suburbanisation remain to be seen. It is possible that the desegregation witnessed
here is a temporary phenomenon as inner areas transition from over-representation
of poorer groups to over-representation of non-poor, while new concentrations of
poverty emerge in suburban locations.
The analysis in the previous sections suggests that quite diﬀerent patterns of change
are underway in the most central deciles of the cities, particularly in the larger cities
(Figures 3 and 4 above). A related question is therefore whether the reduction in D is
largely, or indeed, wholly attributable to changes in those locations. The answer may
give some clues as to the likely longer term outcomes. The Dissimilarity Index, D, has a
useful property here, because the score for a city is constructed by summing the
contribution of each neighbourhood within it. We can therefore decompose the change
in D into: that attributable to the most central two deciles; and that for outer eight. In
Table 3, we do this for the eleven larger cities where the processes of suburbanisation
are most evident. For ease of comparison, we show the decline in D for the outer eight
deciles multiplied by 0.25, so that the rate of change there can be compared directly
with the rate for the inner two deciles.
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For most of the larger cities, the decline in segregation is (proportionately) faster in
the inner two deciles than the rest of the city but it is still falling in both locations. At
least at this stage in the process, the increasing share of poverty accounted for by
outer areas is not associated with rising levels of segregation there. The poor may be
constrained to the denser outer areas by the need to access cheaper housing, as noted
above, but this has not meant movement in to a small number of areas with existing
high concentrations of poverty. Rather segregation is falling because areas which
previously had an under-representation of poverty are now becoming home to a
larger share of poor households.
Conclusions and discussion
This paper makes an important contribution to the literature on the suburbanisation of
poverty, providing original empirical analyses of change in the spatial distribution of
poverty in the 25 largest cities and urban areas in England and Scotland over the period
2004 to 2015/16. Complementary measures of decentralisation and deconcentration
were used to overcome the challenges caused by polycentric urban forms in particular.
The paper also examines the changes for poor and non-poor separately to explore
whether suburbanisation is a relative process resulting from the dilution of poverty in
inner areas or an absolute process involving simultaneous growth in non-poor and
decline in poor groups, and suggesting displacement of one by the other. Lastly it casts
light on the possible longer-term consequences by examining the changes in levels of
spatial segregation which have accompanied this phase of suburbanisation.
The results show that the suburbanisation of poverty is underway in British cities,
with poverty becoming both less centralised and less concentrated over time in almost
every case (although it is worth noting that it remains relatively centralised in almost
every case for now). Change was fastest in London as theory predicted. It is a unique
city in the UK in terms of its scale and housing market pressures, and it is here that the
impacts of welfare reform were expected to be greatest. Signiﬁcant changes are also
underway in many other cities, particularly the larger ones. At least in the larger cities,
the process can be clearly described as one of absolute suburbanisation with inner areas
losing share of the poor while simultaneously increasing their share of non-poor in
Table 3. Change in segregation for inner and outer city – 2004–2015/16.
Total Inner Outer Outer/4
Larger
London −0.064 −0.015 −0.049 −0.012
Manchester −0.049 −0.017 −0.031 −0.008
Birmingham −0.052 −0.022 −0.030 −0.007
Glasgow −0.054 −0.014 −0.040 −0.010
Newcastle −0.032 −0.011 −0.021 −0.005
Liverpool −0.042 0.001 −0.044 −0.011
Leicester −0.059 −0.024 −0.035 −0.009
Sheﬃeld −0.014 0.001 −0.014 −0.004
Leeds −0.022 −0.002 −0.019 −0.005
Bristol −0.025 −0.008 −0.016 −0.004
Nottingham −0.047 −0.023 −0.025 −0.006
Averages −0.042 −0.012 −0.030 −0.007
Source: Data from EIMD and SIMD. For Glasgow, change is for 2004 to 2012.
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almost every case. In London, change is occurring across a large swathe of the more
central half of the city. In the other large cities, the changes up to now have been limited
to the most central two or perhaps three deciles.
At the same time, these shifts are accompanied by signiﬁcant and unexpected
reductions in spatial segregation or unevenness. These changes potentially cast the
processes of suburbanisation of poverty in a rather diﬀerent light, as a shift away
from the historic legacy of urban divisions arising from industrialisation. They contrast
quite strikingly with some recent studies which have found rising levels of segregation
in many European cities (Musterd et al., 2016) and they certainly warrant further
investigation. It is unclear in particular why lower income households are increasingly
found in locations which have not had an over-representation of poverty in the past.
Although we cannot look at tenure changes, this shift has occurred as rental housing in
the UK has changed from largely social renting to majority private renting (Kemp,
2010). Where the former tends to be built in large scale developments and to house
concentrations of low income households, the latter is likely to be more dispersed.
Whether this represents a positive opportunity for low income households to exercise
more choice in housing location or not remains an open question.
It is possible that the reductions in spatial segregation might be only temporary – a
transitional phase on the way to establishing new forms of division as implied by the
“urban inversion” thesis. We do show however that, in this period, the reductions are
occurring not just in the centres of the large cities where the over-representation of
poorer groups is declining, but also in the outer areas where proportions poor are
rising. Of course, if rising levels of poverty in some suburban locations prompt a
reaction from more aﬄuent groups, further rounds of adjustment may follow through
the class-based equivalent of “white ﬂight”. For the moment, however, we do not see
such processes underway.
This paper shows the wide variations between cities. City size emerges as an important
factor as theory suggested. Further work could focus on explaining more of the variation
between cities, both in their starting points as well as in the direction of change, following
Musterd et al. (2016) approach to explaining changes in segregation. Beyond city size,
obvious factors to take into account would be housing market pressures or aﬀordability,
again a particular concern in London, and the level of decommodiﬁcation through social
housing provision. Such work could point the way towards obvious policy interventions to
re-shape outcomes. The paper also shows the value of viewing suburbanisation through
both decentralisation and deconcentration measures, particularly in the context of the
more polycentric urban forms which exist in some British TTWAs. In these cases, there is
often no clear process of decentralisation, while deconcentration is a more relatively
process – the result of both poor and non-poor groups moving towards less densely-
occupied areas, albeit that the poor shift slightly faster.
One particular strength of the analysis here is the use of a measure of low-income
poverty which is constructed from linked administrative data, giving small area mea-
sures of the numbers poor at regular time intervals. The Income Deprivation measure
captures people in households reliant on out-of-work beneﬁts as well as those in
working households but still on a low income. Changes in the welfare system over
time mean that we are eﬀectively using a threshold to identify poverty which moves up
and down but only to a very limited extent, and we work around the problems this
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might create by focussing not on absolute change but on the relative shift of groups,
poor and non-poor, between the set of neighbourhoods which make up each city. There
is some potential for the changes in the Income Deprivation measure to have impacts
which are spatially uneven and which could therefore distort the picture of spatial
change but we do not believe this to be in any way signiﬁcant.
One major issue in the debates about suburbanisation is understanding the processes by
which suburbanisation occurs. With the current data, we cannot show that there is a process
of direct displacement here, with poor households pushed out by rising housing costs, and
being replaced by higher income groups. It is possible that reductions in low income groups
in inner city locations are due to voluntary outward movements ow low-income individuals
as they exercise positive choices to seek housing in alternative neighbourhoods, in part
facilitated by the shift to private renting. However, the timing of the changes, coinciding
with sharp cuts in welfare and housing subsidies for the poor and worsening housing
aﬀordability strongly suggest that displacement is the key underlying process.
Beyond the question of processes, we also need to understand the consequences of
these changes, particularly for social welfare. There are questions about the subjective
experience of suburbanisation, and the extent to which the displacements entailed are
experienced as signiﬁcant losses of desired communities or attachments. There are also
important questions about the welfare and opportunities for low income households in
the locations where their concentrations are increasing. There are potentially complex
trade-oﬀs here, with welfare gains from better air quality or access to natural environ-
ments and green space, for example, as well as losses such as access to public transport
services or to employment opportunities. Nevertheless, documenting the scale and
nature of the changes, and the processes which underpin them – the contribution of
this paper – remains a valuable ﬁrst step.
Notes
1. This was done on the basis of the distribution of unit postcodes, using a lookup ﬁle kindly
provided by Dr Paul Norman, Leeds University.
2. All code used to perform the analyses are freely available from the following web address:
https://osf.io/wtsxu/.
3. We make one change to the list, merging the London TTWA with a new TTWA ﬁrst
identiﬁed in 2016, covering Slough & Heathrow. This area to the west of London centres
on the major employment centre formed around the airport and its related industries.
However, it is continuous with the western suburbs of London and, while commuting
ﬂows may be suﬃcient to reach the threshold for self-containment, it clearly still forms
part of the London housing market.
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